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Christianity and Society

A POSITIVE TREATMENT OF SEX

by

ROBERT H. BONTHIUS

THE SOURCES AND CURES OF SOCIAL ILLS:
A SYMPOSIUM

by

ALEXANDER MILLER AND ROGER L. SHINN

BOOK REVIEWS

AUTUMN 1949 40 CENTS

Volume 14 Autumn 1949 Number 4

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

A Quarterly devoted to Christianity and Social Reconstruction

Published by the FRONTIER FELLOWSHIP: Christians for Social Reconstruction (Formerly the Fellowship of Socialist Christians)

A SPECIAL ISSUE

The next issue of CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY will be devoted to an appraisal of existentialism in philosophy and theology. Articles scheduled include: Dorothy Emmet, "Existentialism"; Paul Tillich, "Existentialism and Religious Socialism"; L. F. Thornton, Jr., "Jean-Paul Sartre—Ally of Christianity?" Through the co-operation of several publishers and prominent scholars, an unusually valuable book review section is planned.

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Subscription Rate: $1.50 per year; 40c per copy
4 Shillings per year in England
7 Shillings and Six Pence in Australia
Published Quarterly

Mrs. Nola Meade, Secretary, 3041 Broadway, N. Y. C. 27
English Agent: Davis McCaughey, Annandale, North End Road, London N. W. 11

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

VOLUME 14 NUMBER 4

EDITORIALS

We Have This Treasure in Earthen Vessels

According to the Christian faith, life is and always will be fragmentary and incomplete. It has intimations of a perfection and completeness which are not attainable by human power. There is a treasure in life but it is contained in earthen vessels, "that the excellency may be of God and not of us." This is to say that the final completion of life through the "forgiveness of sins and the resurrection of the body" is in God's, and not in our own, power. The Christian faith involves the tremendous affirmation that life is ultimately meaningful despite all the abysses of meaninglessness which yawn at the edge of every structure of meaning; that the treasures of life are not dissipated, though they are borne in earthen vessels; that life may be complete despite its fragmentary and incomplete character.

Every individual must come to terms with the frustrations of life and learn that God's "strength is made perfect in weakness." We "bring our years to an end like a tale that is told," and the brevity of our years prevents any task from being finished. No one ever possesses all the prerequisites of the "good life" in terms of health, security, comfort, or the respect and confidence of his neighbors. Every "successful" life has had to cope with some disappointments, failures and abortions. Neither the processes of nature nor the large web of history ever operates in complete conformity with the needs or desires of any individual.

But it is not the relation of the fragmentary character of life to individual destiny with which we are here concerned. It is more important to call attention to the fact that our generation aggravates all the difficulties of our era by its impatience with the frustrations and inconsistencies of the historical situation.

We live in a period in which there is neither peace nor war. The logically-minded idealists seek to persuade us that unless we are able to establish an absolutely secure peace, we will ultimately be engulfed in a total war. Another war is indeed a grim possibility. But it does not necessarily follow from the present reality of a "cold war". One way of avoiding the dire reality of another war is to live with patience and courage through the ambiguities of the present. These ambiguities are greater in our own period than they have been in more stable periods. But there has never been a period in the history of mankind in which there was a perfect concord of all human desires; in which individuals, classes and nations were not a peril to each other because they had contradictory ambitions and desires. We always live in the perils not only of "land and sea" but in "peril of false brethren." One way of overcoming such perils is to establish more perfect political instruments of accord with our neighbors, whether nationally or internationally.

Another way is to learn how to bear the enmity of those who oppose us without too much hysteria.

The dislocations and maladjustments of our age are greater than those of any previous age because we have not learned how to achieve tolerable justice and social harmony within the conditions of a technical society. Furthermore we have been forced to contend with a Nazi rebellion against the remnants of our civilization and also with a false communist scheme of redemption from our ills. This false scheme of redemption has aggravated the problems of human togetherness. It may be worth noting that the communist scheme of redemption is false precisely because it promised too much. It held out the hope that the reorganization of society would destroy every form of friction between man and man and would, in addition, overcome the enmity between man and nature by bringing all natural forces under the dominion of the human will. The evils of fanaticism which arise from this pretentious ambition of redemption are not easy to bear. But they may be borne with greater equanimity if it is recognized that they are only slightly more pretentious than the dreams of emancipation from the ills of nature and of history in which all of us indulge. We are in conflict with our fellowmen precisely because we seek to complete our life too perfectly; and what we desire for ourselves is in contradiction with what they desire for themselves. If we can cloak our desires so that they appear to be not merely our desires but a scheme for the resolution of conflict between all human desires, we seem to have a special warrant for the fulfillment of our desires. Communism is, in a sense, the vision of the industrial poor, who have persuaded themselves that there is a scheme which will not only overcome their poverty but will, in addition, eliminate war, racial bigotry, human selfishness and every other human ill. This is merely a more fantastic version of the kind of day-dreams in which all men indulge. The business classes of the world defend the capitalist system, which favors their power and privilege, on the ground that it is the only possible basis for all forms of freedom. Thus the confusion which communism sows in the world is only slightly different from the confusion in which every class and nation is involved. We seek the gratification of our own desires in a larger measure than their conflict with competing desires warrants; and we make confusion worse confounded by dreaming of a resolution of all conflicts upon the basis of a system which will give the advantage to our desires.

Obviously a tolerable harmony of life requires a patient and contrite understanding of the causes of disharmony, particularly our own responsibilities for them. It may require generations before the virus of communism is overcome. We will lack the patience to put up with its intolerable claims and pretensions and the courage to eliminate the injustices, which gave rise to its resentful hopes, if we do not abandon some of the "liberal" dreams of completing life too simply.

The liberal culture of our day has always regarded the fragmentary character of life as a phenomenon of yesterday which tomorrow was in the process of overcoming. It has lacked every sense of the perpetual ambiguities in man's historic existence and the persistence of life's fragmentariness, no matter how great human power over nature might become.

It is a good thing to "grow up" and to overcome the weaknesses of childhood. But the strength of maturity is closer to the weakness of death than childhood is. So it is with the collective, as well as the individual, destiny of man. We are always challenged to "complete" life within given conditions, to establish justice and peace. But whatever we establish is ragged, imperfect, inconsistent and unstable. The harmonies of life which we establish will be the more perfect if we do not strive for false and abortive harmonies which leave the weakness of man out of account, including the weakness of the idealist who draws the picture of utopia.

We are constantly exhorted to "idealism" in our day. But the world is a conflict between various types of idealists who do not understand that the treasure of our ideals is borne in earthen vessels. A greater degree of modesty on the part of idealists might serve to compose these conflicts; and a greater degree of patience in bearing our share of the insecurities of the world, which have been aggravated by our own illusions, will prevent present tensions from issuing in overt conflict.

Socialized Medicine in Britain

The necessity of surveying every problem of justice with as few dogmatic presuppositions as possible is nicely illustrated by the experience of Britain with socialized medicine. The basic provisions of the national health act represent a great achievement in social justice. Free medical care, including hospitalization, necessary appliances, and medicine, is now available to every member of the national community. This represents an ideal for which America will have to strive for years to come. The opposition of the medical profession to our own health program is only one of the strong recalcitrant forces which must be overcome before we can offer basic health security to our citizens. Adequate medical care in this nation is still the monopoly of the well-to-do and the very poor.

But there is never a simple "ideal" in social justice. The British health service is ideal from the standpoint of the breadth of its securities. But the medical profession is taxed with tasks beyond the limits of its endurance. There is good evidence that doctors lack time for adequate diagnostic work. Furthermore the cost of the service is greater than anticipated. This contributes to the size of a budget which the income tax payer feels increasingly as a great burden. Sir Stafford Cripps' very honest budget message made it clear that no reduction of the tax could be expected so long as the government financed social services on the present scale. The new budget, with no promise of relief to the tax payer, has created an atmosphere of pessimism which has led to the loss of many labor seats in the municipal elections.

This loss may or may not be an augury of a defeat of labor in the coming parliamentary elections. It is clear however that a socialized community reaches a point where it becomes obvious that its services are paid for, not by the wealthy but by every one. This is not, however, a serious defect in a socialized economy. More serious is the obvious waste in the time and energy of medical men if no checks are placed upon the services which the citizen may claim from the doctor. Marxism has always lacked understanding of the limitless character of all human needs, desires, and ambitions. "To everyone according to his needs" is an impossible goal because it is not possible to set a limit to human needs. In medicine the limit of need would seem to be furnished by the health of the citizen. But no one is perfectly healthy, and there is no end of inconsequential ailments for which a patient may seek a doctor's ministrations. Human beings are, on the whole, too thoughtless to justify a community in allowing them to set their own limit on the demands which they may make of a public servant. In short the British health service will have to find some way of placing a check upon the claims which individuals make upon it. The service must be essentially free; but some system of graduated payments above specified annual limits will have to be found.

While America is regarded by Britons as a nation lacking in a proper sense of responsibility for the welfare of the whole, we do have a more generous system of free education than even socialist Britain. But our free education above the grade school level is not absolutely free. If the proposed system of federal scholarships should eliminate the extra charges which are now paid by the student in higher education, it will become increasingly necessary to make such scholarships subject to tests of ability and diligence. A completely free system of education up to the final limit of university

education is no more possible than a completely free system of medical care.

The extension of socialized services in a modern welfare state is a great moral achievement. It implements a Christian understanding of the limitless character of a man's responsibility for his neighbor. Insofar as socialism has understood this responsibility better than conventional Christianity it is more thoroughly Christian than conventional Christianity. But a welfare state, informed by too pure Marxist thought may fail to guard against the limitless claims which may be made upon it, while it is seeking to do justice to its limitless responsibilities. Such failure means that it does not understand the problem of human egoism as it should be understood from the standpoint of a Christian interpretation of human nature.

British socialism has been much more successful than any continental Marxism precisely because its Marxist presuppositions have been more thoroughly diluted with Christian insights than the socialism of the continent. But its health program is a little too utopian to survive in its present form. Its weaknesses may be obscured for the time being by the theory that the undue demands upon the doctors represent a "backlog" of unsatisfied medical needs. Since there is an element of truth in this argument, it may well preserve the present program for some time to come. But ultimately it will be discovered that something more than a backlog of untended ailments prompts some people to make inordinate claims upon the doctor. Then a way will be found to protect both the doctor and the more modest patients against the claims of the thoughtless.

Plutocracy and World Responsibilities

The dominant power of the United States in the world today, and the influence of the American plutocracy in American life, raises an interesting question. Is it possible for a nation so strongly influenced by a politically inept business class to make a success of its hegemony in the world?

About the political ineptness of the business class there can scarcely be a question. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in his important new book "The Vital Center", makes a most devastating indictment of the political incapacity of the American plutocracy. He shows that American conservatism had spiritual stature only when it was under the leadership of such quasi-aristocrats as the early Federalists and the later "Hamiltonians" of the Roosevelt-Lodge type. The Republican party had moral stature only in the brief period of Lincoln when industrial capitalism combined with free soil agrarianism and the anti-slavery impulse to give a new impetus to American politics. Since the Civil War the American business community has made no other contribution to our political life than to seek the greatest possible restraint from government interference with business, while at the same time seeking as many governmental subsidies as possible in the forms of tariffs and land grants to railroads. In foreign policy it has been isolationist with little or no understanding of the responsibilities which accompany the growth of American power. Republicanism resisted the efforts of both Theodore Roosevelt and Willkie to reform it from within. Modern conservatives with a genuine sense of world problems, of the type of Henry Stimson and Averil Harriman, have had to find their function under the aegis of Franklin Roosevelt, who was significantly not a business man but a Hudson river landowner.

In Louis Hacker's history of American capitalism he assigns the creative role in American life to the industrial capitalists, who actually created the industrial and technical efficiency of modern America, while he regards "finance capitalism" as the villain of the piece. But in foreign policy the roles are reversed. The so-called "international bankers," whatever their motives, do have some understanding of the world scene. The industrial capitalists, insofar

as they still exist, help to organize "America first" committees and try to preserve American power in a cradle of continental security. Mr. Hacker regards Andrew Carnegie as the last and greatest of the really creative industrial capitalists. It may be significant that Carnegie's view of international affairs was comprehended in a vague and sentimental quasi-pacifism. He was convinced in 1907, when he created the Carnegie Peace Foundation, that the abolition of war was so imminent that he would have to provide his peace foundation with further reformist objectives after the goal of world peace had been made secure.

At the present time the American business community thinks it makes a great contribution to world affairs by reiterating the virtues of the "American way of life" and by making quite sure that American power will be used only to guarantee the extension of this "way." Since America alone has the economic abundance to permit itself the luxury of this "way of life," which is to say that we still can permit ourselves the freedom of a relatively free market, nothing could be more irrelevant to world affairs than the self-righteous preoccupation of the American business community. What it regards as the pinnacle of spiritual achievement is viewed by an impoverished Europe and an even more impoverished Asia as the aberration of a wealthy fool who has no conception of the hard necessities which his poor neighbors must face. From the perspective of Asia in particular the "American way" is not the attractive beacon of liberty which its proponents fondly imagine. Asia is tempted to communism. Even in India nothing but a fairly rigorous socialism will be able to stem the tide against communism.

We began with the question whether a nation, in which a politically inept plutocracy has as much power as in America, could meet the responsibilities of its power in the world community. The answer to that question can be more optimistic than our foreign critics usually imagine. It is that the plutocracy is more influential in projecting its view of America in advertising slogans than in determining political policy. The plutocracy is fortunately as inept in domestic politics as in foreign affairs. While it tries to convince the world of the superior virtues of its way of life, it cannot convince the common men of its own nation that its answers are correct, even for this favored nation. Recently it lost a national election, which even its enemies thought it would win. The common people of America returned a rather little man, not quite adequate for the job, to the White House rather than risk the dangerous joy ride of free enterprise which the the Republican party promised the nation. Nor is there any immediate prospect of the return of the Republican party to power. It has enough power in Congress to make the elaboration of a consistent foreign policy difficult. It will try to prevent a viable solution of the British dollar crisis by insisting that the British are poor because they are socialists, whereas it is quite obvious that they are socialists because they are poor. But in the end the political power is not in their hands. The American plutocracy will succeed in bringing various contradictions into our foreign policy; but it will hardly succeed in frustrating the purpose of the nation to give support to the free world in its struggle against communism, without insisting upon our particular form of freedom.

There is a bare possibility that the kind of pragmatic political program which has been elaborated under the "new deal" and the "fair deal" may prove to be a better answer to the problems of justice in a technical age than its critics of either right or left had assumed. Though we have no business to prevent the general drift toward democratic socialism in the world, it is worth observing that even this democratic socialism is still encumbered with certain Marxist dogmatisms almost as confusing as the dogmatisms of the plutocracy. The socialists of Germany, for instance, assume that the socialization of the Ruhr industry must be regarded by the rest of the world

as a guarantee against the use of Ruhr industrial power for purposes of aggression. This assumption rests upon the erroneous belief that capitalist nations are "imperialistic" and socialist nations are not. It must be fairly obvious by now that socialist nations are not endowed with a special virtue of disinterestedness. They pursue their national ends as other nations do; and they may, as other nations, be tempted to pursue ends which are not in accord with whatever may be, in a particular situation, a more inclusive purpose. Certainly socialist nations, if they are democratic, have the usual check upon military ambition. The common people do not like war. But that is a democratic rather than a socialist check.

There is evidence that even so pragmatic a socialism as the British variety tends to meet crises by dogmatic programs. The socialization of steel, for instance, was not dictated by the same immediate necessities as the previous socialization programs. It seemed necessary to maintain the morale of a party made up of workers who expected greater benefits from socialization than they have in fact received, and whose disappointed hopes might be assuaged by the promise of more socialization.

It is furthermore not at all clear that British socialism has solved the problems of incentives in industry. The early socialist utopian idea that everyone would be actuated by the "service" rather than the "profit" motive in a socialized economy has certainly proved erroneous. The "service" and the "profit" motive, or more exactly the egoistic and alteregoistic motives, are in fact much more complexly interwoven in real life than either capitalists or socialists understand. The British government is harassed with unauthorized strikes which are a peril to the national economy, motivated by the resentment of workers who had expected a greater private advantage from socialization than is, in fact, possible in a poor nation. The same poverty which prompted the avowal of socialism in many European nations, may in fact lead to its defeat, if the poor discover that even the socialization of property does not make poor people rich in a poor nation.

The problem in modern technical society is so to distribute economic power and so to bring the undistributed centers of power under democratic control that the highest justice may be achieved. This problem can not be solved if property is dogmatically regarded either as the primary instrument of justice or as the primary instrument of injustice. It can not be achieved if the power of the state is regarded as inevitably evil or dangerous; but neither can it be achieved if it is assumed that the power of a welfare state is inevitably benevolent or that its benevolence will inevitably be wise. We have to move from case to case and from point to point in achieving justice while preserving freedom in a technical society. The dogmatisms of the American right are a great hazard to the achievement of justice either domestically or internationally. But even the mild dogmatisms of socialism are not harmless. There is therefore the bare possibility that the unplanned improvizations of our early New Deal may gradually grow into a purposeful pragmatism in American and world politics. In that case we might make a significant spiritual contribution to the cause of democracy and not be consigned to the role of being merely the money lenders in a good cause.

Freedom as a Luxury

Candy, or as the British say "sweets," has been put on rationing again in Britain after being free for six months. Thereby hangs a tale which teaches us a lesson about the relation of freedom to control. When the candy manufacturers were able to produce an amount of candy equal to the total national consumption before the war, the government felt it safe to remove candy sales from rationing control. It was glad to do this in order to satisfy a wide public clamor for more free goods. But as soon as candy was freely available the demand for it far exceeded the average consump-

tion before the war. Either Britain had cultivated a sweeter tooth, or, what is more likely, the scarcity of other edibles led to an increased demand for sweet things. The excess of demand over supply led to long queues of customers, to favoritism in distribution, and to embarrassment for distributors, many of whom were forced to institute their own ad hoc rationing system. In consequence of these difficulties the government finally reinstituted rationing in candies in the middle of August, to the great relief of the same customers and distributors who had clamored for decontrol.

The lesson in this little bit of history reaches far beyond the problem of candy rations or of rationing in general. It proves to what degree the vaunted virtues of the "free market," upon which we pride ourselves so much in this nation, are merely the by-product of an economic situation which most of the world must regard as a luxury. In almost all modern industrial nations, with the exception of our own, the production power does not equal the demand of consumers for goods. Even in our own nation we have been involved in inflation because it proved impossible under conditions of full employment to produce enough goods to satisfy all demands. We had our own experience after the war with a too precipitate decontrol of meats, for instance, which resulted in high prices for meats. If prices rise high enough they do of course restrict consumption, but merely upon the basis of capacity to pay. The poor are priced out of the market.

This is why the most disciplined poor nations achieve a high degree of justice through planning and control. The less disciplined nations provide every luxury for the rich while the poor are in want. Nations as wealthy as our own, indulge in free markets with less catastrophic results than in poor nations, but not without marked consequences in injustice. In short, the "freedom" which we celebrate as the last word in political idealism is, from the perspective of the rest of the world, merely the luxury of a very fortunate nation. That is why we have, and will continue to have, little success in commending the "American way of life" to the rest of the world. We imagine ourselves the keeper of the ark of democratic virtues; but the world regards us as a profligate rich man who can afford to be wasteful.

The controls required by poor nations for the sake of justice are not, however, the final answer to the problem of freedom and justice in a technical society. It may well be that a healthy technical society can preserve its freedom only if it has enough economic margin to permit itself the luxury of a free market in some areas of its economy. For obviously complete planning does lead to an omnicompetent state.

A POSITIVE TREATMENT OF SEX

By ROBERT H. BONTHIUS

It is time for Christianity to treat sex positively. A drive so persistent and so interesting cannot be ignored or condemned successfully. It cannot be simply proscribed outside marriage and tolerated within it because it propagates the human race. If Christianity is to be a greater help to man in his search for salvation, it will have to recognize that sex needs saving, and it will have to learn how to save it.

I believe that it is possible for faith to do this—and do it well. As a matter of fact, there have always been some Christians (and I venture to say there are more today than ever before) who have found salvation through faith in the sexual aspects of their lives as in other aspects. They have discovered that Christianity welcomes, guides, and satisfies sex in ways that elevate the spirit, harmonize the partners, and bless the community.

But for the vast majority this has not been the case. The Christianity they have known treats sex negatively or ignores it. Church history reveals that most of the leading thinkers as well as masses of the faithful have looked down upon this all too human urge, considered it unworthy, immoral, even evil.

For example, Tertullian, still more Jerome and Augustine, regarded suppression of sex desire as a good thing, meritorious in and of itself. They all approved of conjugal intercourse when the purpose was procreation. But they surrounded even this relationship with suggestions that took away the rightness of it. N. P. Williams points out that in Augustine's thought concupiscence tends to be used in its most restricted sense with the result that original sin, considered as *vitium*, equals concupiscence which in turn equals sexual passion —an equation which explains for Augustine the mode of sin's transmission, and which marks sexuality as intrinsically bad.[1]

This patristic attitude conditioned every subsequent conception of sex in the churches. "In the Catholic Church suppression of sex life was regarded as a meritorious act, by means of which every believer could gain a special divine reward, and, in certain circumstances, had a definite claim to such reward." [2] Apparently in both the patristic and medieval periods even marriage could not legitimately be regarded as *remedium concupiscentiae*, though this is generally accepted by the Roman Church today as a "secondary" aim of marriage.[3]

Modern Catholicism does not conceive of sexuality as evil in itself. But the idea that complete denial of the drive is the more excellent way has not been abandoned, as is evidenced by the evangelical counsels —poverty, chastity, and obedience. Virginity, Henry Davis reminds us, is still the higher, nobler state. It is "absolutely more pleasing to God." [4] Catholicism continues to ask its people for conscious regulation of sex so rigorous that it borders on deliberate mortification. Father Davis, for instance, warns in his works that concupiscent desires, while natural, "will be the occasion of sin if they are accepted consciously and deliberately." [5] The only legitimate reason for intercourse in marriage is generation, and Catholics have it on highest authority that they are solemnly obligated to abstain from conjugal relations which are only for

[1] *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1927), p. 366.

[2] O. A. Piper, *The Christian Interpretation of Sex* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), p. 20.

[3] See A. L. Ostheimer, *The Family: A Thomistic Study in Social Philosophy* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1939), p. 31.

[4] *Moral and Pastoral Theology* (4th ed. rev.; New York: Sheed & Ward, 1943), II, 201.

[5] *Ibid.*, I, 26.

the sake of pleasure.[6] "Those who are not yet married and those who have been married may not take pleasure in thought of what is allowed to married people," declares Thomas Slater, "for in practice such pleasure cannot be confined to the intellect; it also excites the sensual appetite and this causes temptation and sin."[7] Here is evidence of the restrictive attitude toward sex which possesses the leadership of the Roman Church today.

It must be admitted that in the beginning there were good reasons for this attitude. Consider the moral conditions of the Roman Empire, the fact that sex was symbolic of the worldly life which Christians renounced, and so on.[8] There is still great merit in the emphasis of Catholicism upon the discipline of the vitalities. The way Catholic teaching links sex privilege to personal responsibility for the possible outcomes of sex activity surely contributes to stable family life. The teaching that marriage is a sacrament serves to recognize the role of sex somewhat, and in a limited way sanctifies its expression.

However, the Catholic position does not bring out the positive, constructive place of sex in Christian living. On the whole, Romanism emphasizes sex as something to be suspicious of, something to surmount, something to repress. This comes out clearly in the negativism of its educational policy. Father Davis admonishes parochial school teachers and Catholic parents to do the following things to train their youth aright—moderate strictly all gratification of the sensitive appetites; help youth to practice positive mortification, such as going without trivial necessaries or pleasant unnecessaries; urge children to expel immediately all impure fantasies; teach them to avoid "soft and sentimental friendships with those of the opposite sex at a comparatively early age, since such friendships induce precocious sexuality"; prevent mixed games and camps especially after the age of puberty; discourage promiscuous and general friendships between the sexes.[9]

Historically speaking, Protestantism cannot lay claim to a more creative approach. Indeed, it has all the defects of the Catholic approach without some of its virtues, for it does not teach that marriage is a sacrament (for good theological reasons—but with bad practical effects in some cases), and it has no moral theological writings comparable to those which instruct the Roman Church on the nature and practice of sexuality. Like Catholicism, Protestantism does not declare that sex is evil in itself and it does provide a place for it in marriage—it serves to propagate the race and raise up a "holy seed" unto the Church. Moreover, some present-day Protestant leaders are calling for a reconsideration of the whole subject in the hope of working out a positive treatment of sex, a project quite possible for Protestants and not likely to be attempted by Catholics. Yet, for three centuries past, large sections of Protestantism have hushed, avoided, and in many cases condemned sexuality as such. I believe that this is still the case. What R. B. Perry has called "the cult of denial and concealment" of sex which was puritanism has brought the Protestant churches to the twentieth century without a positive point of view.[10] As a result, these churches with notable exceptions teach nothing about it or simply hold on to the "sex-is-a-necessary-evil" interpretation.[11]

Since historic forces in the modern period have brought sex out into the open, and

[6] See Pius XI's monumental encyclical on marriage, *Casti Connubii* (1930).

[7] *A Manual of Moral Theology* (3rd ed.; New York: Benziger Bros., 1909), I, 152.

[8] See E. R. Groves, *Christianity and the Family* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1942), chap. 3, esp. p. 43.

[9] *Op. cit.*, II, 202.

[10] *Puritanism and Democracy* (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1944), p. 230.

[11] The Protestant clergyman who presented the document, "American Protestantism and Mental Health," before the International Congress on Mental Health in London in August, 1948, devoted the most space to just this attitude. "Either directly or indirectly . . . (Protestant churches) have taken the point of view that sex is morally wrong," they pointed out. See *Presbyterian Life* (Sept. 18, 1948), pp. 13–14.

exacerbated the problem of maintaining traditional Christian standards of chastity and fidelity, churches must discover what is the Christian message of salvation for sex. The interpretation of sex in terms animalistic (Kinsey) or "romantic" (the movies and magazines)—it would be hard to say which is more misleading—and the experience of rapidly increasing promiscuity and divorce require whatever prophetic criticisms and redemptive relationships the Gospel affords.

In my own thinking there are a number of lines along which Christian conviction can develop towards a more helpful treatment of man's insistent sexuality. Since there are so many ramifications of it, it is practically impossible to do more than suggest some of the emphases which it seems to me Christian leaders could be making in their proclamations, preaching, youth education activities, published materials, and counselling, especially pre-marital counselling. This list of emphases that might be made is not complete, nor is it thought to be original. Happily, some of the convictions are already common to Protestant progressives, and only need to find more frequent articulation. Others have yet to be examined, and perhaps rejected or greatly modified. These ideas have found expression in important books that ought to have much wider circulation (books by such as Burkhart, Dickerson, Elliot and Bone, Gray, Groves, Hadfield, and Piper), in family institutes in churches, in sermons, in classes, and in interviews conducted by the small but increasing number of the clergy and the laymen who are concerned with this neglected ministry.

1. *Sexuality is a divine endowment. It is therefore essentially natural and good.* This conviction is characteristic of Biblical thinking and is fundamental to every positive view. "God created man in his own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it." [12] So declares the Priestly writer. Earlier the Yahwist had expressed the same belief, and supplied the further insight that this good gift may be misused, sin presupposed. These recognitions of the basic rightness of sexual differentiation and of the significance of sexual activity (for the purpose of procreation, it must be admitted) are the more notable because of their inclusion in the introductory section of the Pentateuch, which sets forth the determinative principles of Hebrew-Christian faith.

The practical import of this teaching is, in the words of A. Herbert Gray, "that the sexual elements in our humanity, once rightly understood and finely handled, make for the enrichment of human life, for the increase of our health and efficiency, and the heightening of our joy." [13] Christianity will be true to its Biblical heritage when it no longer hesitates to proclaim that "a God of love in designing our human nature cannot have put into it anything which is incapable of a pure and happy exercise; and in particular that in making the sex interest so central, permanent, and powerful in human beings He must have had some great and beautiful purpose." [14]

2. *Sex in man has significance beyond the physical, and it cannot be rightly understood or satisfactorily expressed apart from its spiritual import.* In one way or another Christianity has always recognized that sex desire is a compound of nature and spirit, that it is no simple physiological function in any man. In this it is consonant with the best of modern psychology. For even in the most pathetic perversions, human sexuality appears to be the expression of the mind of the pervert. Sex is always charged with beliefs, feelings, and evaluations about it and about the partner with whom one is sexually engaged. Christian faith can suggest those meanings

[12] Genesis 1:27–28.

[13] *Men, Women, and God* (Rev. ed., New York: Harper and Bros., 1938), p. xiii.

[14] *Ibid.*

which ennoble and sanctify sexual behaviour.

It is characteristic of modern interpretations of sex to regard it as a simple physical function. Taking seriously the kinship of man with other animals, modern views tend to regard sex in man as they see sex in animals—simply an innate hunger. So Kinsey, while prefacing his report with the acknowledgment that the biologic approach cannot lay claim to complete comprehension of reality, implies throughout his work that any other approach to sex is impossible, *per se* obscurantist. He endorses what he calls "a third possible interpretation of sex" (in contrast to the "hedonistic doctrine" and the "ascetic view"): namely, that sex is "a normal biologic function, acceptable in whatever form it is manifested." [15] Kinsey connects the "biologic viewpoint" with Freud, whom he calls the chief contributor toward its adoption so far as sex is concerned.

Such naturalism regards man's sexual activities in the same impersonal and amoral way that it looks upon his nutritional behaviour—they are merely endeavors to satisfy organic desires. For example, Kinsey in writing of intercourse declares, "The most important consequence of sexual orgasm is the abrupt release of the extreme tension which preceded the event and the rather sudden return to a normal or subnormal physiologic state after the event." [16]

In principle the naturalistic interpretations of sex reject spiritual conceptions. They hold that the mental and moral aspects are or ought to be considered unimportant, even irrelevant. Of course, they know that man generally believes them to be important and relevant. In so far as man regards sex this way he needs to change his judgment of the case. The naturalists hold that ethics should relate to sexual behaviour only at those points where sex activity harms other people. (The only laws needed if society's interest is that of protecting persons, says Kinsey, are the criminal code concerned with assault and battery![17]) Apart from limitations that protect the citizenry against the consequences of inordinate sexual behaviour, it should not be regulated by state or church, by law or custom. Sex action, like eating, is a necessary effort of the "human male" and female to satisfy the urges and reduce the tensions of animal instinct. Sex is "a normal biologic function, acceptable in whatever form it is manifested."

Christianity does not deny that sex has a physiological basis. It affirms the fact freely and gladly.

> As the bird wings and sings,
> Let us cry, "All good things
> Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more now,
> than flesh helps soul."
>
> —Browning.

It simply goes on to affirm that creaturely man lives "at the juncture of nature and spirit." [18] He does live at the juncture. There is no part of him that does not partake of beliefs, feelings, and evaluations. Sex is subject to and compounded with spirit. "It is not something which man could conceivably leave imbedded in some natural harmony of animal impulses," points out Reinhold Niebuhr. "Its force reaches up into the highest pinnacles of human spirituality; and the insecurity of man in the heights of his freedom reaches down to the sex impulse as an instrument of compensation and as an avenue of escape." [19] Human sexuality is to be differentiated from the sexuality of all other animals not only by the fact that, as Aldous Huxley has put it, man is "continuously sexed" whereas the lower animals are "discontinuously sexed." Sex is qualitatively different in man because it always has some

[15] A. C. Kinsey, W. B. Pomeroy, and C. E. Martin, *Sexual Behaviour in the Human Male* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1948), p. 263.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 158.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[18] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941–43), I, 181.
[19] *Ibid.*, I, 236.

kind of *meaning*. For man is a creature of spirit as well as flesh, and his every action has significance for himself and for those with whom he acts. "We have found no evidence," writes Anton T. Boisen, "that sexual maladjustment operates directly through its organic effects." [20] Sexual difficulties are more psychological than physiological and they require resolutions which only new evaluations can supply, he says. This underlines the importance of the simple Christian teaching that sex in man has significance beyond the physical, and that it cannot be understood or expressed with full satisfaction apart from its spiritual import.

3. *In considering what is the spiritual import of sex within marriage, the conception of sex as a means of procreation should be subordinated to the idea of sex as an instrument of communion.* Jesus indicated that God intended male and female for each other and that for the sake of being together "a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one. So they are no longer two but one. What God has joined together, let not man put asunder." [21] There is here the positive suggestion that marriage is for communion, that it is the completion of what otherwise remains incomplete, and that this completion is the will of God. Henry Elkin has alluded to this significance of sex: "Sexual union is not only of bodily organs and fluids, in which the male impregnates the female, but is a counion, or *communion,* in which each fecundates the spirit of the other. Thus human sexuality, by enriching the personality, has the spiritual function of creation over and above the natural function of procreation." [22] Christianity needs to proclaim what Emil Brunner calls "the independent meaning of the erotic and sex element within marriage" as an expression of love and not merely as a means of perpetuating the human race.[23]

Sex acts in general and intercourse in particular are suited to be expressions of love for and joy in one's beloved. In time of family stress, sex relations may be the signs of spiritual solidarity and support one for the other. During days of grief or busyness, expressed sexuality can serve to restore the partners to each other. After a quarrel, sex may be the means of expressing penitence and desire for fullest reconciliation. There are many aspects of married life for which sex can be the external expression. Rightly understood and finely handled it can prove sacramental—"the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual bond which unites two loyal hearts in endless love." [24] What is needed is the recognition of the many significances of sex in marriage, and of the beautifully unique contributions it can make toward community in love. Sexual communion, be it a kiss or a caress or intercourse, should be the physical symbol of fidelity and devotion. This is the note which Christianity can strike as no naturalistic concept of sex is able to do.

This conception of the communal character of sex has important implications for the unmarried. The hardest problems people face today lie in the pre-marital and extra-marital fields. Higher education, vocational requirements, problems created by the war, lack of housing, as well as lack of positive ethical guidance have exacerbated the condition of the unmarried. Here above all, the churches need to do more thinking and provide better guidance than they have. Obviously a concept of sex which limits itself to procreation inside marriage offers nothing but prohibition to those outside. Such an approach is not

20 *The Exploration of the Inner World* (New York: Willet, Clark & Co., 1936), p. 275.

21 Mark 10:7–8 (Revised Standard Edition).

22 "The Sexual Crisis of Our Time," CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Autumn 1948), pp. 9–10.

23 *The Divine Imperative,* trans. Olive Wyon (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), p. 368.

24 A phrase used by the minister in connection with the giving of the ring in the Methodist marriage service. See *The Methodist Hymnal* (New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1935), p. 541.

only unrealistic, since people will pair no matter what obstacles are put in their way. It is not Christian. If God has put sex into the human constitution and made it a positive part of personal development and social relationships, sex has significance for those in the unmarried state as well as those who are married. Christianity must now explore what sex might mean and how it might be expressed in the unmarried, particularly in the state of adolescence when the drive is strong, especially with males.

While space does not permit elaboration on this point, I should think that the basic teaching of the faith here is that all sexual relations should be carried on in the context of loving respect for the partner. Sex expression can only be satisfying if it has the consent of one's best judgment and highest ethical ideals. Otherwise it leads to inevitable dissatisfaction, irritability, and frustration.

The Christian ideal for sex relations of every type on every level is that they be personal expressions of mutual love combined with willingness to take responsibility for all that mutual love implies. Since the ultimate physical expression of communion includes the possibility of begetting children as well as the pledge of unqualified fidelity, sexual restraint on the part of those who have not entered marriage will be expected. Most marriage counsellors today are emphasizing the importance of restraint in pre-marital relationships. They are convinced that it wreaks no harm and leads to more harmonious marriages. Dr. and Mrs. Judson T. Landis in their recent book, *The Marriage Handbook,* attack the common but fallacious conclusion that the alternatives for youth are either pre-marital indulgence or dangerous repression. "It is true that marital adjustment is often handicapped by the strong inhibitions of one partner or the other," they say. "But these inhibitions are developed early in childhood and are usually due to the faults of our system of sex education. Normally well-adjusted young people will suffer no ill effects from following a plan which includes self-control and emphasizes avoidance of excessive sex-interest until they can marry. The advantages are all on the side of this course of action." [25]

4. *Fullness of sexual satisfaction comes with the begetting and the raising of children.* The emphasis of the churches through the centuries upon procreation takes on new meaning when it is realized that the supreme joy of marital communion is reserved for those who raise a family. "From love that has thus run its natural and ordained course a new life results," writes Gray. "Even human love has creative value, and by it the doors are opened into that most sacred world in which a man and a woman succumb together to the power and beauty of an infant, thrill together over its untold charms, and find that little hands are clutching at their hearts with amazing and mystic power. And not until that point is reached is love made perfect." [26]

Such an emphasis upon the positive happiness of rearing a family is badly needed in this era of sexual cynicism and marital despair. Twentieth century man needs a vision of home and children which can kindle his imagination and make him want to help create a little community of love with another who shares his hopes. We do not hear about the countless homes which help men regain their sanity and which restore their faith in God, others, and themselves because such families do not make good "copy." The newspapers advertise only the unhappily married. It is the task of agencies like the churches to proclaim the positive truth about the possibilities of married love. It is in parentage with all that it requires in terms of responsibility and work and all that it affords in terms of rich and intimate privilege that modern man may find one of the most redemptive experiences of life.

[25] Quoted from a review of this book in *Family Life,* Vol. 9, No. 5 (May 1949), p. 3.
[26] *Op. cit.,* pp. 26–7.

5. *Self-discipline in the sexual realm of life is a necessity for good sexual development.* From the first chapters of Genesis on, faith has understood that sex might be misused. It would be no favor to society for Christianity now to forget this important insight. Sex expressed without restriction can be fully as troublesome and tragic as sex repressed without limit. It is not the sex element itself which is impure, declares Brunner. "The evil in the life of sex is the isolated function." [27] A positive treatment of sex will help man to discover the possible misuses of the sex drive, and the danger of exercising it in supposed isolation from spiritual beliefs, positive feelings and moral evaluations.

Niebuhr has listed three ways in which man misuses sex. Sometimes it is simply to gratify a hunger; sex thus serves self-love. Sex activity sometimes serves to release the individual from an uneasy sense of guilt through identification with the sexual process or another person. Sexuality can provide man with escape from the responsibilities imposed upon him by virtue of his freedom by entrance into subconscious or unconscious forms of existence.[28] Undisciplined sexual activity also destroys community because it treats the partner as an object, simply "making use" of him or her. It incurs the possibility of offspring who cannot be properly cared for, and the disgrace of women left in helpless loneliness. It makes sex an end in itself, thus setting up within the individual conflict-ful attitudes toward sex which prejudice good love relations later on. For all these reasons, sexual discipline is necessary, and Christianity can illumine the points at which it is both right and wise to exercise restraint.

6. *The awareness that all love is of God, and finds its completion in the love of God, is the capstone of the Christian view of sex.* As often as one reads the Great Commandment he is reminded of the fact that Christianity accepts and glorifies the sex drive. It does not call man to repudiate his erotic desires; it commands full use of them. "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind," and "You shall love your neighbor as yourself." [29] Sex, conceived as the physical aspect of *eros,* is then the striving basis of union with God. "The insight that sex love at its best is not merely a seeking after the finite love object, but after the Love that is beyond that of father and mother or of husband and wife, has consequences of greatest therapeutic importance," Boisen believes.[30] Sexuality which is controlled and directed with the idea of achieving fuller communion with God and man will elevate the spirit, harmonize finite partners, and bless the community.

Positive treatment of sex will recognize the full dimension of spirituality that is in it. It will invite man to put his passion to use in the service of God and others. It is time to place more emphasis upon the development of ardent love for the Infinite Creative Being and his creatures, whose service does not exclude the sex drive but channels it. Human sexuality contains the vital resources for a lifetime of response to that Infinite Love of which all finite love is the imperfect representation.

[27] *Op. cit.,* p. 349.
[28] *Op. cit.,* I, 240.
[29] Mark 12:29–31 (Revised Standard Version).
[30] *Op. cit.,* p. 279.

REALISM OR POST-REALISM?

By ALEXANDER MILLER

The occasion for this comment—and for that of Roger Shinn which is to appear with it—arose at a Conference of the Frontier Fellowship some time ago. But the issue is a general one, and since the conference now is a bit remote, it's the general question which is important.

It appears to me that during the last twenty years the group represented by the Fellowship in the United States, and by related groups in other countries, has reached certain agreed and most fruitful insights into social change and the Christian responsibility in relation to it. Putting it in the most general terms—terms which Will Herberg used again at the conference under discussion—we have finished with utopianism and we try to be Biblical realists. We read the Bible as meaning that historical possibilities are indeterminate but not ultimate. This enables us, so we have affirmed, to work for social change with hope but without illusion.[1]

My fear now, as I tried to express it at the conference, is that the emphasis is shifting in the direction of social pessimism. Instead of affirming that historical possibilities are indeterminate but not ultimate, we tend to affirm, not only that they are *determinate* but that they can be calculated in advance.

For an example, take the subject which provoked discussion at the conference. Charles Lawrence described the situation as affecting the Negro in the United States, and among other important comments suggested that the most obvious occasions of racial trouble arise at the point of economic pressure—where jobs are short or housing values are in question. Reinhold Niebuhr and even more emphatically Will Herberg took pains at once to dispose of the illusion, as it seemed to them, that racial prejudice depends on economic pressure and would disappear when the pressure was lifted. There are deep roots of group assertiveness and so on which would survive any such damage and make for a perennial problem.

That may well be true: but it is not *necessarily* true, on any doctrine essential to faith. For what seems to be implied is that we have *doctrinal* reasons for believing that a considerable weight of race prejudice would remain even if the obvious economic occasions were removed. But have we? Is there anything in our doctrine of human nature which enables us to predict the result of the economic experiment in advance, and affirm that it can provide only a very partial solution of the problem? I am free to believe that experiment may well prove that if economic pressure were lifted we might have a solution virtually complete, or only a minimal problem remaining. At any rate the issue is one of evidence and not of doctrine. We do not know the result until the experiment is made.

What we do know is that sin will remain. The Devil will still be active. But the problem may be of quite a different order, or of quite a different form. It might be for example that the "whites" throughout the world would be discriminated against by the colored majority, although if the justifiable resentment of the colored races lived that long and took that form I'd bet there would be solid economic factors keeping it in being![2]

1. All this is at a secondary level. I am speaking of the point at which our work takes historical prospects into account. Ultimately it is done "for Christ's sake and the brethren's" in a sense which leaves no room for discouragement whatever the historical results may be.

2. This reminds me of a remark on the race question in Herbert Agar's *A Time for Greatness,* to the effect that the question is not whether we shall deal justly with the colored races, but in view of the certain predominance of the colored peoples, "whether the white race will join the human race in time."

In the abstract the point may be a bit subtle. But it becomes important because, as it seems to me, a failure to make proper distinctions here may land us in social pessimism and quite some way from Biblical realism. For example, to prove his point at the conference Will Herberg cited the fact that full employment, while we had it, did not make an end of race discrimination. It seems to me that he would not use so queer a logic unless he believed that some valued dogma were at stake. The problem of discrimination is many generations old: we had full employment, apart from war abnormality, for about two years. Even more important is the fact that while we had this short spell of full employment, the problem of security of employment remains to be solved, and the trade unions are still defensively organized. We simply do not know what real job security would do to race discrimination.

Then Roger Shinn—who is speaking for himself on an adjacent page—brought up the Army, where, as he said, in spite of job security and the absence of the obvious economic pressures prejudice against Negroes was worse than in civil life. Now here again it seems to me that for dogmatic reasons the argument is being asked to carry more than it will bear. The army is an artificial construct out of the ingredients of our contemporary society. It exaggerates some conventional prejudices and it breaks down others: but it is too temporary an association to prove anything about our age-long problem.

I'm all for sound doctrine, including a sound doctrine of sin. But I don't think a sound doctrine requires a strained logic to support it. And the examples I have given seem to me to involve a neglect of the "indeterminate possibilities" in history, and the mysterious "according to your faith be it unto you" of the Gospel. We do not work because the results are assured; but we are not bound to limit in advance what God may give us in the shape of results. The general point of view we hold in common, because it rejects false optimism, moves always on the edge of pessimism and therefore needs continually to be re-stated in debate of this kind.

The relevance of economic factors to this or that problem is not the main point, but it might be worth saying this: that the Fellowship which has read its Amos and its Marx seems to have an obvious calling to keep alive a witness against the phoney spirituality which is the church's perennial temptation. The economic problem is not the only problem, but the "love of money" figures prominently as a root of evil even outside of Amos and Marx.

SOCIAL EVILS AND THE "MYSTERY OF INIQUITY"

By ROGER L. SHINN

Social radicals are often on the search for a single source of our social ills, in the hope that one mighty blow of the axe at the root of the tree can shatter evil. The effort is spurred on by opposition from those who find it comfortable to believe that social ills are incurable. Attempts to improve the lot of man run into a curtain of pious slogans: "You can't change human nature." "The poor ye have always with you." "There shall be wars and rumors of war." "God is punishing them for the sins of their ancestors."

Rebelling against the dishonesty of such complacence, radicals have seen things that can be changed, and sometimes they have changed them. Their confidence that wrongs can be righted by attention to specific causes has expressed itself in numerous theories of the origin of injustice. The most epochal has been the economic interpretation of history, which attributes human troubles to private property and class struggle and promises redemption through revolution and the classless society. More widespread though less potent has been the attempt to make ignorance the villain and education the cure-all. Elimination of government interference, free trade, world government, nursery schools staffed with psychiatrists, athletics and recreation, the annihilation of Hitler or Stalin, technocracy, the elimination of priests or the conquest of secularism—all have been proposed as the answer to social wrong. Last year an architect promised salvation through a new type of apartment house providing recreation, nurseries, and central cooking: "Relieved of the two great burdens of heavy housework and the care of children, the family will live a happy existence. There will be no quarrels between neighbors and no divorces in my house."

The common element in these many promises is a refusal to take seriously the "mystery of iniquity." The problems that in various ways haunted the Greek tragedians, Shakespeare, and moderns like Melville and Eliot, as well as the Biblical writers, are dismissed with contempt. Sinfulness and love of power are regarded as lazy expressions, which take the place of precise analysis. To talk of general moral causes of social difficulties, says John Dewey, is to think on the primitive intellectual level where demons are the cause of disease.

The obvious advantages of specific analysis of social ills need not be questioned. Although religious insight may discern the corruption of the heart as the deepest cause of inflation or economic injustice, such an observation does not take the place of the economist's analysis. Specific factors of production and distribution produce specific effects. Legislative acts can mitigate inflation, depression, and unjust contrasts between poverty and wealth. But sometimes, it must be admitted, the best planned schemes have failed simply because a people did not have the moral stamina to make them work. The postwar years have seen many such failures, around the world, of attempts at rationing, currency and land reform, handling of refugees, and distribution of food.

There is just one main trouble with the usual attempt at finding a catch-all cause for social conflict: when the cause is removed, conflict continues. Of course endless rationalization is possible to explain, for example, why the state does not wither away after communist revolutions; but only those are convinced who are determined to be convinced. I recall hearing an expert on anti-semitism once explain the economic

causes of prejudice. By refined techniques of investigation he had amassed evidence that factory workers' anti-semitism was due to fear of competition for jobs. The data were convincing, until someone asked whether other social groups had been studied. The expert said with surprise that he had found anti-semitism as bad in country clubs as on assembly lines. The economic determinist will answer that country clubbers also have economic insecurity under capitalism; and that is true. But the same logic can be extended to show that civilized men always have their insecurities, whether economic or not, and that these insecurities breed social disease.

Thus theories of multiple causation of evil become more plausible. An analysis of the race problem, like Myrdal's *American Dilemma,* with its deliberate rejection of panaceas, is far more impressive than any pamphleteering approach by enthusiasts for Marxism or psychiatry or education, however well documented. It is certainly true that the many contributing causes of social problems interact and pyramid upon each other. Winrods and Coughlins spread their hate most easily in times of economic and social disturbances. Prejudice against the Negro will be increased if white home owners think (whether falsely or truly) that an encroaching Negro district is reducing property values. Men will fight over food when it is scarce, but will (sometimes) be more complacent about its distribution when there is plenty.

But even the most skillful theories of multiple causation lack understanding unless they probe beneath specific social causes to the basic anxieties of the human spirit which have been the concern of tragic art and religious faith. Dewey, in answering the claim that war results from certain deeply-rooted human impulses, shows that the divergent origins of war may range from love of Helen of Troy to the most abstract economic factors. War, he concludes, is "a function of social institutions," not a result of fixed impulses. I am certainly not trying to maintain that international war is ineradicable. But Dewey's analysis inevitably leads to the question of *why* such a variety of human impulses, working through such divergent social institutions as history has seen, have repeatedly and fatefully led men to *war.* Einstein is more profound when he says that it is far easier to denature plutonium than to denature the evil in man. And Bertrand Russell is wiser than the Marxists when he answers them, in *Why Men Fight,* by finding vanity, rivalry, and love of power, as well as acquisitiveness, to be "the prime movers of almost all that happens in politics."

Against the realism of biblical faith most of our schemes of social salvation seem especially inadequate. Their proponents earn T. S. Eliot's pointed criticism of those who attempt to escape

> From the darkness outside and within
> By dreaming of systems so perfect that
> no one will need to be good.

Two illustrations will sum up my point. Both happen to be directed primarily against doctrines of economic causation of social evils, but their bearing is wider.

The first illustration is personal observation of race prejudice in the army. After living in most parts of the country, I have seen prejudice against the Negro in vicious forms. But by and large I have found it especially pernicious in the army. I have learned with gratitude of occasional examples where army life transcended civilian attitudes; but no one would deny that race prejudice presented an extremely difficult problem in the army. Interestingly the problem seems to have been worse in Europe. Exposure to a society not impregnated with this special American form of race prejudice, so far from softening hostilities, usually heightened them.

What accounted for this prevalence, often increase, of race prejudice? There was no problem of job security in a society where most men would have been grateful for unemployment. Rivalry for advancement

was never against the Negro. The old motives made no sense, but the attitude flourished.

The explanation which seems to make sense is that the army is built on a system which accentuates the prestige motives typical of all social life. Every rank considers itself victimized by the ranks above, and compensates by taking it out on the ranks below. The main trouble with the system is that the most numerous group in the army is the privates. The Negroes were the one group on which all ranks could vent their pride and hostilities. So the soldier often decided that he'd be damned if he'd let Negroes shop at his PX or walk down the street with English girls. The motivation would appear to be much closer to what Christianity has called the sin of pride than to the economic class struggle.

The second illustration comes from Karl Marx. In one of his tirades against the greed of the expropriating class, Marx finds support in an attack on usury by Martin Luther, whose polemical gifts were no whit less sharp than Marx's. The point which Marx emphasizes is, curiously, that "the love of power is an element in the desire to get rich." The long quotation from Luther stresses the uneconomic facts that the usurer "wants to be God over all men," "so that he may have all to himself, and every one may receive from him as from a God, and be his serf forever." Marx goes on to comment that "original sin is at work everywhere." (*Capital,* Vol. I, pp. 649–50, Modern Library edition.)

Granted that Marx uses "original sin" as a figure of speech, he chooses a particularly apt one. Had he gone on to draw the serious implications of his own analysis at this point, he would have blasted the illusions in his whole interpretation of history. For if love of power moves men to get rich, there is no cure for social ills in preventing men from getting rich. Love of power can find other outlets, equally satisfying and disastrous, as many a commissar illustrates. And because the commissar on *a priori* grounds is "incapable" of being an exploiter, his tyranny may be all the worse.

What then can we do about social ills when all our panaceas prove vain? The answer is to attack on every front. We can still seek the positive gains offered by housing, health, freedom from fear of unemployment, social security, education, and all the rest. There need be no relenting in the attack upon specific causes of prejudice and injustice. But the attack will be pressed more firmly by those who will not be shocked when their immediate victories produce no utopias. The battle will be waged more nobly by those who know that the *final* enemy is no one perverse group or class and no specific system, which deserve fanatical persecution, but an inner evil which cannot be conquered by overthrowing an enemy. And the most valiant in the struggle will be those who have found a resource of faith, whether explicit or implicit, which affords a security even when the specific bulwarks of justice and hope are threatened.

TWO PROJECTS

Through the years the Fellowship has contributed to a series of causes which have represented our beliefs in action. At last spring's conference it was decided that we would support two new and creative projects which embody our purposes in unique ways.

The first of these is the East Harlem Protestant Parish, described in some detail in the Summer, 1949, issue of this quarterly. In a distinctive and original way this movement carries both Christian faith and a concern for social justice to a neglected group in our society. Some of our members have been active in, or close to, this project since its beginning. We hope to raise $400 for its support.

The second movement is the Evangelical Academy of Bad Boll, Germany. Through Bad Boll and other similar academies set up since the war, the German Evangelical Church is relating Christianity to lay vocations. In week-long conferences representatives of a designated vocational group (doctors, lawyers, trade unionists, or teachers, etc.) consider their Christian responsibility in relation to their work. This is one of the hopeful movements in post-war Germany. A contribution of $5 in American money makes it possible for a delegate to attend a week's conference. The Fellowship is aiming at a $200 contribution.

Gifts may be sent to the secretary of the Frontier Fellowship, 3041 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.

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BOOK REVIEWS

KARL MARX'S INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY. *By M. M. Bober.* Second edition, revised. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948. 445 pp. $6.00.

This new edition of Professor Bober's well-known study of Marx's philosophy of history is more than a mere revision. It is a thorough rewriting of the older work, involving not only the inclusion of much new material but also in some cases an important shift of emphasis and attitude. For the two decades (1927–1948) that separate the first and second editions of this work were most eventful in all that relates to Marxian theory. Not only have new writings by Marx and Engels been made available, but fascism, economic crisis, and the degeneration of the Russian Revolution have brought a new perspective in terms of which many problems take on new form and require new treatment. Mr. Bober is well aware of these factors and, within the framework of his fundamental approach, has done full justice to them. The second edition of his work is, in every respect, superior to the first, which was already in its time recognized as a really significant study of the most influential interpretation of history since Hegel.

Mr. Bober's presentation of the views of Marx and Engels—he wisely limits himself to the masters—is full, accurate, and thoroughly documented. The criticism, which is to be found in the last five of the nineteen chapters, is sober, penetrating, and singularly free from political passion. It is possible to disagree with Mr. Bober on many points but it is not possible to deny him the merit of having produced a systematic work of authority and worth in a field where so much of what passes for serious writing is no more than dishonest propaganda and party polemic. All thoughtful students of Marx will be grateful for this valuable handbook.

Despite his uncompromising criticism of the many inadequacies and inconsistencies of Marx's views on history—frequently affecting the very foundations of the Marxian theory—Mr. Bober reaches the conclusion that "with all its weaknesses, it remains true that Marx's interpretation of history towers as a signal contribution to social science." With this I certainly agree. But I think there is a dimension of Marx's thought that Mr. Bober, because of his still too positivistic outlook on history, tends to miss. I mean that aspect of Marx's thinking which made it possible for Hermann Cohen to call him "the ambassador of the God of history." The Prophetic-Messianic aspect of Marxism—nowhere so prominent as in the "materialistic conception of history"—is virtually ignored by Mr. Bober. And yet ultimately Marx is not to be understood simply in terms of the Hegelian origins or his "scientific" pretensions. Ultimately Marx is to be understood in terms of Hebrew Prophetism: the Prophetic denunciation of the iniquities of the age and the Prophetic interpretation of history in terms of the outworking of divine intent. In Marx's philosophy—or rather, theology—of history, the Hebraic-Prophetic element is heavily overlaid and corrupted by Hegelian idealism and "materialistic" secularism, but unless this element is seen as somehow central to Marx and his thought, his ultimate significance is bound to be lost.

WILL HERBERG

ANTI-SEMITE AND JEW. *By Jean-Paul Sartre.* Schocken Books, 1948. $2.75.

There are four or five major social problems which every contemporary philosopher worthy of the name must attempt to analyze and solve. Anti-Semitism is one of these Gordian knots. While Jean-Paul Sartre, the French existentialist, has not cut the knot of anti-Semitism, his essay has laid

bare some of its sinews. Do not be misled by the words "essay" or "book," for Sartre has written a political pamphlet in the style of Tom Paine and the mid-wives of democracy. In doing this he is true to his own doctrine of the total involvement of the philosopher in the social scene.

There are four characters in his book. He discusses them in this order: the anti-Semite, the democrat, the inauthentic Jew, and the authentic Jew. The background of the characters is the bourgeois world to which they are all intimately related.

Anti-Semitism is a "mythical, bourgeois representation of the class struggle" (p. 149). The democrat is the Jew's one friend, but a feeble protector, because he defends him as a man only, and not as a Jew. The inauthentic Jew tries to accept the democrat's dictum that he is to be "a man only," but he never succeeds fully, because his situation is that of a Jew, a situation created by the anti-Semite. The authentic Jew, on the other hand, accepts his situation as a Jew and asserts his freedom as a Jew, but this in no wise solves his social or political problem, because anti-Semitism is not a Jewish problem but a bourgeois problem. The decision to be an authentic Jew is a moral decision. It does not change the situation of the Jew, which remains one in which everything he does will be used against him.

Sartre's discussion of the anti-Semite is the least interesting section of his book, perhaps just because the anti-Semite is the least interesting of people. To the democrat he has a certain appeal because he has chosen anti-Semitism as a passion, and passion is the democrat's demon. As Sartre points out, the anti-Semite has chosen passion because of the fear it inspires in others, not because he is passionate. To be passionate the anti-Semite would have to be a man and the anti-Semite wants to be anything but a man who has to choose himself and his freedom, the existentialist definition of man.

Sartre spends only four pages on the democrat. It makes one wonder if that is all the democrat deserves as a friend of the Jew. Perhaps Sartre intends to write a novel on the democrat and the Jew. It would be an admirable pair for the existentialist theme of man's denial of his own freedom, both the democrat and the Jew being caught in the trap situation of anti-Semitic passion.

Sartre's description of the inauthentic Jew is superb. It digs beneath the stereotype which is not really a stereotype at all, but a "heads I win and tails you lose" strategy of the anti-Semite. It spells out the means by which the Jew tries to escape his situation and shows how each of these strategies is in turn used by the anti-Semite further to enmesh the Jew in the toils of his Gordian knot. Not only does it help the friend of the Jew understand him and fill us with compassion, but indirectly it damns every one of us as being involved in the crime of collaboration with the anti-Semitic lie.

There are certain weak points in Sartre's approach to anti-Semitism which stem directly from his philosophy. These weaknesses, however, should not lead one to underestimate the real value of his book. For instance, his statement that the Jew is "perfectly assimilable" (p. 67) is open to question if one takes Judaism as a religion seriously. However, Sartre would find it difficult to do this because he tends to lump historical religion with the worship of a non-historical God which he categorically rejects as inconsistent with human freedom. Sartre fails to give Jewish history its due when he says, "The Jewish community is the least historical of all, for it keeps a memory of nothing but a long martyrdom" (p. 67). Another difficulty arises when one tries to differentiate between the authentic Jew and any other man who has chosen his own freedom. Is their only difference their "situation"?

Sartre has given us some powerful weapons in the fight against anti-Semitism. He is readable, quotable, and pointed.

L. F. THORNTON, JR.

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH AND THE NEGRO. *By Frank S. Loescher.* (Foreword by Bishop William Scarlett.) Association Press, 1948. 159 pp. $3.00.

The Protestant Church and the Negro is the result of three years of study into the policies and practices of Protestant denominational bodies, local congregations, and educational institutions. In a careful and scholarly manner, Dr. Loescher more than amply demonstrates his thesis "that the Protestant Church in general, by the practices of its congregations and educational institutions, is following the status quo in Negro-white relationships and that the Protestant Church as a social institution is not actively furthering the integration of the Negro into American society."

After a statement of the problem, Dr. Loescher examines the various policy pronouncements of the denominations during the past forty years. Here, a gradual, then increasing awareness of the churches' responsibility is found—an awareness that moves slowly from general platitudes to specific evils concerning Negro-white relations in general, and, in some instances, to an examination of intra-denominational racial practices. From the level of national pronouncement, Loescher moves to a consideration of actual practices of the denominations at the national and regional level. He finds that, while all predominantly white Protestant churches operating in the South make some concessions to Jim Crow, there is almost always an attempt either to mitigate or to abolish discrimination in national conventions. Moreover, the Lutherans and Episcopalians—with the exception of the Diocese of South Carolina in the latter case—practice no formal organizational segregation. (This last generalization fails to take into account the "Convocations of Colored Workers" which are maintained in most if not all of the Southern dioceses and which, in some cases, represent a sub-conventional legislative body.)

It is at the local church level that Dr. Loescher finds the church in its most exclusive form. Although approximately six per cent of the Negro Protestants in the United States are members of predominantly white denominations, it is found that probably not more than *one per cent of this six per cent* is found in local congregations in which they worship with their white fellow-Protestant Christians. The practices of the church-related educational institutions appear only slightly more favorably under Dr. Loescher's analysis.

Despite the discouraging findings of his study, Frank Loescher is still hopeful. He sees the mounting awareness and apparently increasing good-will of white Protestants toward their Negro fellows as encouraging; and he recommends careful action-oriented research by social scientists into ways of implementing pronouncements at the local and regional levels.

The book is a sound, workmanlike, and scholarly job. The sociologist often finds himself piecing in the missing sociological interpretations; and many will not share the author's optimism after looking at his evidence. As a documentation of the plight of the Protestants in race relations, the book fills an important research need and points toward many much needed research jobs.

CHARLES R. LAWRENCE, JR.
Brooklyn College

THE CHURCH'S MINISTRY IN OUR TIME. *By Henry Knox Sherrill.* Scribner, 1949. 159 pp. $2.00.

The author of this little book is the Presiding Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Bishop Sherrill has served American Protestantism as the executive of the Joint Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains, and was a delegate to the inaugural assembly of The World Council of Churches last summer.

Bishop Sherrill is aware that modern civilization shows many signs of being in a precarious situation. He is aware that organized Christianity seems to be able to

do little about it. He moderates both judgments by reminding his readers of numerous individual exceptions to the trends he sees, but he still makes the judgments.

It is probably a healthy thing when the official head of one of America's more prominent Protestant denominations points to the problems of our day and the relative ineffectiveness of organized Christianity—he is very careful continually to include the Roman Catholic Church in the same boat with the rest of the churches. But it cannot be said that the Presiding Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church has too profound a grasp of the significance of what he sees nor of the problem before Christianity itself.

Bishop Sherrill is a kindly and mellow "liberal." He gives us an ethical Jesus and a church with an ethical role to play—both in teaching and example. He understands somewhat the dangers of complacency on the one hand and despair on the other, but he fails to see that the situation he is describing is really more than an intellectual problem. His use of Cochrane's *Christianity and Classical Culture* fails to get him into the heart of a situation which must be to a man of his broad sympathies a tragic one.

Bishop Sherrill's book is a good example of the way the liberal tradition in American Protestantism is waking up to the realization of the fact that the plight of the churches is symptomatic of a problem in western culture. But it is also a good example of the limitations of a tradition which never did know the Gospel in terms of judgment and redemption either to interpret the problem profoundly or to see through the tragedy in a creative manner.

This book which comprises the Lyman Beecher Lectures of 1948 at the Yale Divinity School may serve a useful purpose if it is not only read for what it says but also for what it is unable to say. Of interesting significance in precisely this area is Bishop Sherrill's last chapter—which is advice to prospective ministers in these difficult days. One hopes that while the Church and its clergy, if either is to be effective, must have a much more dynamic conception of judgment and redemption than has Bishop Sherrill in this book, they will not gain these qualities at the expense of his breadth of sympathy and warmth of heart.

CHARLES D. KEAN

CHRISTIAN PATHS TO SELF-ACCEPTANCE. *By Robert H. Bonthius.* Kings Crown Press, 1948. 254 pp. $3.25

Robert Bonthius is thoroughly convinced that "healthy self-acceptance is a *sine qua non* of spiritual well-being," and he is equally convinced that the nature and methodology of self-acceptance as developed in psychotherapy provide infinite resources for the enrichment of the various Christian pathways. These convictions are packed into five well organized and amazingly succinct chapters. Bob Bonthius has done more than an academic job. He has illuminated the area between psychiatry and religion and thus becomes another of the *Frontier Fellowship* members to open up new fields.

A device of great effectiveness in this study is the division of the Christian pathways to self-acceptance into three groupings, the rejectionist, the forensic, and the meliorist. The rejectionist pathway, embodied in Calvinism, finds the true self in renouncing the self of pride and sin. On the other hand, the forensic (Catholic) view offers the way to bliss and self-acceptance by keeping a divine law. And meliorism in John Wesley and others has held that man's relationship with God, which is his beatitude, "can be progressively, though not completely, attained in this life."

This classification is certainly inspired and it simplifies the problem of analysis. In Bonthius' hands it becomes a masterful tool for objective study, but it seems to leave some questions. I suppose Augustine would be considered a rejectionist and yet

is obvious that there are elements of the ther two views in him. Luther is used in ne study itself as an example of the rejec- onist view and as illustrating certain fea- ures of the meliorist path. One might uestion also the implicit imputation to the orensic path alone of the use of the sacra- nents to secure self-acceptance. Luther's iews of Holy Communion and the primi- ve Church's unconscious use of the sacra- nents long before they came to be legally nceived, make such classifications difficult o follow. Again, whether it is Chauncy r Drummond (p. 85), or Bonthius sum- ning up (p. 205), the insight that "one ust experience the loving attitude before ne can feel and manifest it" would seem o be more simply Christian than meliorist. espite such objections this threefold clas- fication is useful in the broad emphasis r which Bonthius employs it.

Among the positive contributions made y psychotherapy to the field of religion nd ethics is the emphasis that the demands f religion and ethics are most genuine and eligious when they are related to every age of the individual's life rather than ropounded as normative rules which must e applied to everybody at all times. In is sense at least, religion and health are dentical concerns. And each Christian athway to self-acceptance is enhanced by ne experience and use of the methods of ynamic psychology.

When the disciples objected to "another" ho was casting out demons in Jesus' name e counseled them not to forbid the man nd reminded them that such a man would ot soon speak evil of Him. Here we find sychotherapy doing "mighty work" and ur task seems to be to learn again the ays and means of these deeds.

C. R. STINNETTE, JR.

HE NAKED AND THE DEAD. *By Norman Mailer.* New York: Rinehart, 1948. 721 pp. $4.00.

It is of more than small interest that the eading "best seller" novel of 1948 was *The Naked and The Dead.* This harrowing tale of war experiences in the South Pacific Islands headed the best seller list for approximately half of last year. An analysis of such phenomenal attention would be of value.

The very title of the book is significant. This cynical title seems to indicate the mental mood of a great number of our fellow citizens. Obviously many people believe with Mailer that there is little hope, or even little prospect of building a possibly decent world. Only the unpleasant realities of blood, sweat, tears, death and destruction are for our generation. Certainly it is tragic that it has to be a young man of twenty-five who writes such a cynical novel. It is disheartening enough when a civilization must produce men stooped of shoulder who write of skeletons rising out of the midst of phantom past sex orgies and maggots and infection and gore. When a young man has lost the sense of perspective and the hope for any possible better future, it is a sign of horrible decadence.

Mailer does give us in his novel what must be a rather fair presentation of young Americans under the horrors of the War. He points out that the effects of combat and skirmish are like the results of alcohol, or even the table of the psychiatrist. All that is deepest in life wells up. Sadly all that is deepest in the lives of the men he describes is sordid. Is this then the establishment of the Hebrew-Christian doctrine of sin? Or does Mailer tell us something even sadder from the ethical point of view? There is nothing that arises from the slough of these minds which resembles decency. The maggots that crawl on the putrefying flesh of his dying men are not nearly so repulsive as the maggots which have been feeding on their souls. If Mailer is right the Christian idea of sin must be reformulated and this reformulation must be downwards!

This all seems to add up to the fact that our modern Baalism must either explode in its degradation or there must be an up-

ward trend. Surely if the insights of the faith are right (namely that Christianity finds its best expression when men are at rock bottom) this is the time for the Church really to be preaching. Even if this author is exaggerating, his exaggeration has hit a note of realism and truth to many people. Thus, now is the time, now if ever, for the Message of Salvation to be preached. Mailer's Modern Man is at the middle point of the way to Damascus: the summons to Ananias is The Present.

ADOLPH BEHRENBERG

THE CHURCH OF ROME—A DISSUASIVE. *By Richard Hanson and Reginald Fuller.* S. C. M. Press. $2.00.

In these days, when the current of events frequently makes people feel that Western civilization is being ground to powder between the upper and nether millstones of Communism and the Vatican's influence, a book like "The Church of Rome—A Dissuasive" is a very helpful thing.

The authors, who are two Anglican clergyman, have undertaken a theological, and to some extent a psychological, exploration of one of these two modern pressures; and they have done so in as kindly and judicious a mood as the circumstances permit. Here is no tirade against the Roman Church, but rather an analysis of its pretensions which does justice to some real accomplishments but which at the same time goes into the underlying problem.

The authors of this book have not attempted to relate their analysis of the Church of Rome to the contemporary scene in world politics and economics. But their analysis, which springs out of a desire to explore and expose the specious fascination of the Roman Church for many of the intellectuals of our day, is useful to those who look at the whole problem in a broader frame of reference. Indeed it is useful to those who are aware of the issue of what we might call ideological as against simply institutional Catholicism wherever that is found.

Hanson and Fuller build their thes upon the premise that the question, "Wha is the truth?" is sufficiently demanding fo honest people to be suspicious about an institution, organization, or movemen which claims to authenticate itself. Fo Christians, the Word of God in the perso of Jesus Christ in and through the Ne Testament must stand in judgment upo any individual and group achievement n matter what secondary benefits it ma claim to confer. Any other position is i itself less than Christian. The Reformer therefore, were defenders of the Church and the principle of continual Reformatio (as Tillich has so well explained) must b a continual part of vital Christianity.

The Roman Church claims that what i believes to be right is right because it be lieves it, and this definition is subject to n external criticism. But this attitude itse betrays not only an unscriptural pretensio but also an inner insecurity, as Hanson an Fuller demonstrate with a number of exam ples. With its extreme dogmatism abou itself, the Roman Communion is neverthe less extraordinarily fuzzy about the precis content of its own faith. Consequently th "Power Complex" which has marked tha Church during its entire history, accentu ated since Trent, is partially the attemp to fill a spiritual vacuum in its own life.

Hanson and Fuller make an interestin analysis of the appeal of the Roma Church to those who are looking for cer tainty in an uncertain world and expos the inner fallacy of their response to Roma claims. "In fact, in deciding that the au thority to which he submits is infallible man really decides nothing more than tha his own judgment is infallible; otherwis he must admit that his judgment whic tells him that the authority is infallible i itself fallible and liable to mislead him. But the authors do not press the matte further and explore the issue under th heading of what Tillich calls "heteronomy."

Here is a useful book, however, whic gives not only theory but good factual ref

rences to the problem under discussion. s own defense of Anglicanism is mild and oes not really limit its usefulness. While is reviewer wishes the authors had raised ore profoundly the issue of religiousness ith reference both to the fundamental roblems of human nature and the social tting in which the issue must come to fe, nevertheless he recommends this book a valuable weapon for the religious con- ct of our day.

CHARLES D. KEAN

OTES TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF CULTURE. By T. S. Eliot. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949. 128 pp. $2.50.

The snorts and snarls that have greeted . S. Eliot's most recent book should not allowed to conceal either the brilliance his performance or its need of criticism. liot is a stimulating and annoying thinker, ith his mingling of penetrating Christian sights and notions of social reaction hich have not the slightest relation to the ew Testament.

Eliot here sets out to rescue the word *ulture* from its constant misuse. In the rocess he says a good deal about his ideas the present state of civilization and the rganization of society. All is written in e beautifully lucid and witty prose of master English stylist.

Culture, for Eliot, is not easily definable id can certainly not be manipulated. It ay "be described simply as that which akes life worth living" (p. 26). To deal ith only one of the problems of the book, liot is particularly concerned with the ansmission of the intangibles that make r culture, in the face of all the evidences cultural decay. He makes effective criti- sms of the current tendencies toward mass niformity and monolithic societies—tend- ncies which are haunting more and more ntemporary writers. Eliot is surely right hoping for a combination of cultural nity and diversity, in which men can nderstand each other, yet enrich each her with their varieties.

But here the difficulties pile up. Some years ago Eliot insisted, for reasons not made very clear, on "a positive distinction between the educated and the uneducated" (*The Idea of a Christian Society,* 1940, reviewed in this quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 1). Now he sees the need for a hereditary class structure. Objecting equally to permanent castes and to a classless society, he desires a blend of privilege and opportunity, e.g., in education. The reasoning is that "the primary vehicle for the transmission of culture is the family"; therefore transmission of culture requires "groups of families persisting, from generation to generation, each in the same way of life" (pp. 47–48).

If Eliot is scarcely aware of the extent to which privileged classes have been both parasitical and tyrannical, and have often stifled culture as much as they have transmitted it, he does force consideration of the problem of how values will be preserved in a society and how leaders will be chosen. Modern history, for good reasons, has rebelled against hereditary classes. But to shift from aristocracy of birth to a plutocracy of wealth is not much of a gain. Reliance upon those who faithfully follow the twists of the so-called proletarian line gives at least equal cause to shudder. An aristocracy of technicians and high I.Q.'s gives no assurance of preservation of democratic and cultural values. And there is room to doubt the promise that all goes well whenever power is entrusted to those most successful in the pulling and hauling that characterize the struggle for power in governmental, business, and labor politics.

We have not solved the problem of cultural unity and diversity in democracy. The U. S., which has often gloried in its diversity, periodically hears the frenzied cries for enforced uniformity. Witness the demands for loyalty oaths and political conformity now. Even from "liberal" circles are coming proposals that every child be forced to get half his education in a state school; those of us who are most grateful for a public school education can resent this imitation of totalitarianism. How can we secure a measure of agreement on common

values, without resort to compulsion? The answer involves reconsideration of religion and of the family and other social institutions. T. S. Eliot has not given us an answer; but he has shown the difficulties of a problem too many people thought was solved.

ROGER L. SHINN

RELIGION AND THE STATE. Vol. 14, No. 1 of *Law and Contemporary Problems,* a quarterly published by the Duke University School of Law, Durham, N. C. 169 pp. $1.00.

Here is a valuable publication on an issue which has been raised to prominence in recent months and years. Most of u feel about as competent to read a law schoo quarterly as to give Harry Truman advic on how to campaign for office. But to pas by this number for that reason would be mistake. A series of learned, and usuall lucid essays cover the problems of church and state, with the main emphasis on edu cation. A variety of viewpoints, ranging from the Roman Catholic to the thor oughly secular are represented. Among the well-known authors are Edward S Corwin, John Courtney Murray, Milton R Konvitz, Alexander Meiklejohn, Charle Fahy, and others.

R. L. S

PSALM

All Thine enemies are stricken, Lord, yet vengeful. They are harelipped, moronic and diseased, yet vain. They boast, in us life centers its meaning, yet Thou art the Father of all meaning. They scorn or even praise Thee, yet all adore idols. Selah.

Heart restless for the holy is the truly man. His passion is for Thy blessing, Lord. The angel-struggler is the truly great. In contrition his epic thunders; in contrition he is free.

His eyes cannot hold the tears of hi thanksgiving. His goodness is bodied fort joyfully, yet tinged with sorrow for its pa in Thy betrayal. He marches out agains the giant Philistine, but first within hi own heart.

He witnesses in love love's self dot dwell in Thee, O God.

In his glance Thou dost wonderfully re veal Thy grace. Thou hast spun his day like the purest psalm.

RONALD A. LANDOR

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